Introduction
. . . for by the beginning of September the Wasp must begin to dig her burrows and search for game for her family.If we look at the Cricket a week, two weeks, or even longer after the murder, we shall see the abdomen moving slightly, a sign that he is still alive.
The yellow-winged Wasp is not content with comparatively defenseless Beetles and Caterpillars; she hunts the powerful Cricket.
Notice, therefore, the precautions the Wasp takes before setting her sting in motion. She turns the Cricket upon his back so that he cannot use his hind-legs to escape. She controls his spurred legs with her fore-feet, so that he cannot kick her; and she keeps his jaws at a distance with her own hind-legs. She makes him motionless by grasping one of the threads at the end of the abdomen. An athlete, an expert wrestler, could not do better.
Consider also her science. She wishes to paralyze the prey without killing it, so that it will remain in a fit condition for food for her babies for many weeks. If she should leave the Cricket any power of motion, it would knock the eggs off; if she killed it entirely, it would decay. How does she produce this paralysis? She does just what a surgeon would advise her to do: she strikes the nerve-centers that set the legs in motion.
Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?In the analogy of the divided line, Plato divides human knowledge into visible things and intelligible things. Mathematical concepts are intelligible things and geometrical figures are visible things. Mathematicians use both things. However, if we can acquire knowledge only through senses, the next question arises. When did we acquire mathematical concepts? In Phaedo, Socrates answers:
Yes, he said, I know.
And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on --the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that the equals which are derived from the senses-for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short?So, I understand Socrates's statement. However, the important question is remaining. How did we acquire mathematical concepts before birth? The Ancient Greeks could not solve this problem because they did not know the imperceptible entity. Nowadays, I shall propose the answer of this problem. I point out the fact that we know many imperceptible entities now. For example, the computer signal cannot be perceived by any sense, but it is the substantial entity. Also, a DNA base is the imperceptible entity. Before computer age, a DNA base was the closest entity to the natural number one, which is imperceptible, indivisible, invariable and equal to each other. Using DNA bases, natural selection wrote mathematical concepts in our genes. Therefore, DNA bases are relaying points between visual things and intelligible things. Moreover, a DNA base is the candidate of the substance of the natural number one. Because a DNA base has close properties to the natural number one, mathematical concepts may be derived from these properties of a DNA base.
That, Socrates, is certainly to be inferred from the previous statements.
And did we not see and hear and acquire our other senses as soon as we were born?
Certainly.
Then we must have acquired the knowledge of the ideal equal at some time previous to this?
Yes.
That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?